



Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Initiatives and Key Insights

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Personal

Role : Crypto Expert

NE/Dept : BGSW / MS / ECL3

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Education

- Ph.D. (Cryptography, UMN, USA)
- M.S. (Mathematics & CSE, UMN, USA)
- Certified Blockchain Expert™

Work Experience

- **01/2019 – Present : Bosch Global Software Technologies (BGSW)**
 - Research & Innovation (PQC, Privacy Preservation, Crypto V&V, Reusability)
 - Competency Development (Bosch Cybersecurity University)
 - Security Consulting (TARA, Security Concepts, Crypto SME)
 - Security Reviewing (PROSO)
 - **Distinguished Expert, Board of Academics (Math.), MNNIT Allahabad**
- **IIT Jammu, IIT Hyderabad, IIT Palakkad, ISI Kolkata, Univ. of Hyderabad, SPJainSGM, NIIT Univ.:** Adjunct / External / Visiting Faculty
- **Securacy:** Chief Cryptographer
- **AIMSCS:** Faculty Member, Lead Cryptographer
- **University of Minnesota:** Lecturer, Research Assistant, Teaching Assistant, etc.
- **TIFR Bombay:** Research Scholar

Professional Summary

24+ years experience (9 years in USA)

- R&D and Innovation
- Teaching and Training

12+ years leadership experience

- Crypto consulting
- Competency development for academia and industry
- Advanced cybersecurity program development:
 - M.Tech: Information Security, IIT Hyderabad
 - M.Tech: Cyber Security, Univ. of Hyderabad
 - M.Tech: Cyber Security, SPJainSGM
 - P.G.Diploma: Automotive Cybersecurity, BITS Pilani
- Establishing and research and analysis labs
- Consulting
- Mentoring


Research Expertise

- Post-quantum crypto
- CPS, OT, IIoT, & CI security
- Anonymity and privacy in communication protocols
- Searchable encryption for the cloud-based services
- Lightweight cryptography for IoT devices
- Blockchain security
- Hardware security
- Active and passive cryptanalysis


For some problems, supercomputers aren't that super

- Quantum Computing is a rapidly-emerging technology that harnesses the laws of quantum mechanics to solve problems too complex for classical computers.


Superposition



Interference



Entanglement



Market size and value at stake: QC companies began a shift toward revenue generation, earning an estimated \$650-\$750 million in 2024.

Investments and ecosystem

+XX% Compared to previous year

\$8.5B

+25% YOY

total cumulative global
QT start-up investment

367

+5% YOY

start-ups in the
QT ecosystem

\$42B

+26% YOY

total government
investment announced

Quantum technology market size scenarios for 2035 and 2040

Based on existing development road maps and assumed adoption curve

	Quantum computing	Quantum communication	Quantum sensing
2035	\$28B-\$72B	\$11B-\$15B	\$7B-\$10B
2040	\$45B-\$131B	\$24B-\$36B	\$18B-\$31B

Potential economic value² from quantum computing in 2035:

~\$0.9T-\$2.0T

Potential value driven by four industries by 2035: global energy and materials, pharmaceuticals and medical products, financial industry, and travel, transport, and logistics

1. QS approach through clusters of use cases based on recent development, announcements, and breakthroughs.

2. Economic value is defined as the additional revenue and saved costs that the application of QC can unlock.

3. Per annum.

Evolution of Quantum Computers

- QC has already evolved from theoretical research to an engineering enterprise with a potential to save the industry millions of dollars in production and post-production costs.
- **Denso** claims a 15% efficiency in their Automated Guided Vehicle (AGV) routing.
- **BMW** is exploring QC/QT to schedule robots to seal automotive seams to achieve manufacturing efficiency as it scales.
- **Ford** is exploring QC/QT to reduce wear on commercial vehicles by optimizing routes.
- **Volkswagen** is exploring QC/QT to help customers configure a functional and satisfying vehicle by reducing configuration errors.
- **Toyota & Denso & Volkswagen & AirBus** are using QC/QT for real time traffic management systems and fleet routes & dispatch management.
- **EMEA** claims a 30% increase in paint line capacity and a deferring of \$1 B investment in a new paint line.
- **German Aerospace Center** is exploring QC/QT to optimize airport flight/gate assignment to reduce passenger travel time.

Benefits

**Quantum
Simulation**

**Artificial
Intelligence and
Machine Learning**

**Optimization
Problems**

**Traffic
Optimization**

**Financial
Modeling**

Climate Modeling

**Pharmaceutical
Research**

Bio-engineering

Material Science

**Quantum
Cryptography**

**Post-Quantum
Cryptography**

...

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)

- Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is the study of cryptosystems that
 - run on classical computers; and yet
 - are secure against attacks by quantum computers.
- PQC Techniques
 - Code based (e.g., McEliece'78)
 - Hash based (e.g., Merkle trees'79)
 - Lattice based (e.g., NTRU'95, LWE'05)
 - Multivariate based (e.g., HFE'96)
 - Isogeny based (e.g., SIDH'11)

**Post Quantum Crypto
is NOT
Quantum Cryptography**

FIPS 203: ML-KEM (**Kyber**)

FIPS 204: ML-DSA (**Dilithium**)


FIPS 205: SH-DSA (**Sphincs+**)

Round 4 KEMs: BIKE, Classic McEliece, HQC, and SIKE

Additional Digital Signature Schemes

XMSS, LMS

Quantum-Resilient Security Controls




McKinsey Quantum Monitor June 2025

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
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Quantum Threat Timeline


IBM Quantum Processors




10⁹ IBM hardware road map QuEra hardware road map Proposed resource requirements to break RSA-2048¹
 When number of available physical qubits meets resource requirements to break RSA-2048 (approximate projections)

Classical			Factoring algorithm (RSA)			EC discrete logarithm (ECC)		
Cycles	<i>n</i>	≈ # qubits	Cycles	<i>n</i>	≈ # qubits	Cycles		
$C \cdot 10^{17}$	2048	4096	$34 \cdot 10^9$	224	1300	$4.0 \cdot 10^9$		
$C \cdot 10^{22}$	3072	6144	$120 \cdot 10^9$	256	1500	$6.0 \cdot 10^9$		
$C \cdot 10^{60}$	15360	30720	$1.5 \cdot 10^{13}$	512	2800	$50 \cdot 10^9$		

2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036




- Likelihood of a QC able to break RSA- 2048 in 24 hours
- Directly proportional to the risk
- Within this many years from 2021



Quantum-Resilient Security Controls

Risk Assessment for Security Assets



- **Affected Products:**
 - Internet communication
 - (Connected) Devices
- **Affected Building Blocks:**
 - Secure Communication
 - Secure Boot
 - Security Access
 - Secure Update

Low Risk:
Prepare for Migration

Moderate Risk:
"Conservative Scenario"

High Risk:
"Progressive Scenario"

Very High Risk:
"Opportunistic Scenario"

Migration Challenges:

- PQC requires redesign of security building blocks
- Overcome resource constraints in devices → HW vs. SW impl.
- Long lead times → 10 years(!) in case of HW changes
- Identify suitable PQC schemes → Select standards
- Distribution of SW updates often challenging

**Public-key cryptography (RSA + ECC) broken
with probability 50% – 83%¹**

¹ Mosca, M.; Piani, M. (2022): 2021 Quantum Threat Timeline Report.
<https://globalriskinstitute.org/publications/2021-quantum-threat-timeline-report/>

Quantum-Resilient Security Controls

Why worry now?



"By completing their transition before **December 31, 2030**, stakeholders – particularly cryptographic module ..."



"We want people to take note of these requirements to plan and budget for the **expected transition**"




"a cryptographically relevant quantum computer will be available in the early 2030s; BSI believes that it is already **urgently necessary to take appropriate measures to switch to quantum-safe scheme**"



"For high-risk use cases, quantum-vulnerable public-key mechanisms shall not be used stand-alone **after the end of 2030**, analogously after the end of 2035 for medium-risk use cases"

- Time needed for a large enough quantum computer to become a reality?
 - **x years (~ 15 years from now)**
- Time needed to deploy a quantum safe solution?
 - **y years (~ 5-10 years)**
- Time for which the information needs to be secure?
 - **z years (~ 15 years)**
- **Theorem:** If $x < y + z$, then we need to worry now.



Mosca's Theorem

10

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Do I need PQ Encryption?

For your general day-to-day product / project discussions on slack / internal chat?

For your general online transactions?

In between??

- Analysis required
- Till when do you need the confidentiality?

An extra-marital affair?

For strategic “HARD/GRAY” business decisions?

Do I need PQ Authentication?

For your general
(online) logins?

- To your email / bank / org / etc.

In between??

- Analysis required
- Till when do you need the same authentication credentials?

For access of products in the field with long life?

- Cars
- Satellites
- Manufacturing plants
- Critical Infrastructure
- ...

Boot

Update

Communication

...

Our QR Solutions



QR-Guide

PQC Migration Training & Advisory Services

Expert-led training and consulting built on a strong post-quantum cryptography research foundation, offering proven best practices and technical disclosure of real-world PQC prototypes.



QR-Inspect

Quantum-Readiness Infrastructure Evaluation

A unified platform offering comprehensive crypto discovery and assessment across applications, networks, and databases



QR-Bridge

Cryptographic Overlay Migration Solution

A plug-and-play overlay enabling post-quantum cryptography migration with full backward compatibility, requiring no modifications to existing codebases.




QR-Shield

High-Performance PQC Hardware & Software Designs

Delivers high-performance, quantum-secure IP cores that are hardened against physical attacks, offering best-in-class protection for embedded systems and secure hardware platforms.


Our Assets

Traditional/Classical Security Controls



VULNERABLE

Quantum-Resilient (QR) Security Controls



SECURE

Features

- Real-Time Network Analysis
- Active Network Vulnerability Analysis
- Filesystem Cryptography Analysis
- Application Cryptography Analysis
- Data Sensitivity Tracking Mechanisms
- Privacy Preserving Features

Features

- Support for NIST Standardized PQC Algorithms
- Efficient Hardware Implementations
- Enterprise Software Implementations (Infrastructure, Cloud)
- Embedded Software Implementations
- Physical Attack Resistance
- Formally Verified Implementations

Benchmarking



Security Controls

Secure Boot

Secure Access

Secure Update

Secure TLS

Platforms/controllers

X86

ArmV7

Aarch64 (ArmV8)

TC37xx
> TC38xx > TC39xx

STM SR6x

Agilex7 FPGA

Algorithms

XMSS_SHA2_10_256,

XMSS_SHA2_10_512,

Falcon_1, Falcon_5,

DIL_2, DIL_3, DIL_5,

SPX_MODE_1,
SPX_MODE_5,

KYBER_1, KYBER_3.

Hybrid PoCs
purely software AND/OR
exploit whatever HSMs are
available. e.g.,

For classical algorithms, we
use HSM whenever
available.

For XMSS / SpHincS+, we
use hash accelerators
whenever available.

On FPGA, we use our
optimized NTT
implementation of
Dilithium/Kyber.

Benchmarking: QR-Access

Category	Signature Scheme	Size (bytes)	Time (ms)
Non PQC	ECDSA	Public key : 64 Private Key : 32 Signature : 64	~800
	ECDSA with HW ECC accelerator		~20
PQC	XMSS with SHA-256	Public key: 64 Private key: 132 Signature: 2,532 (incl. 32B of Msg)	~70
	DILITHIUM (SHAKE128)	Public Key: 1312 Private Key: 2528 Signature: 2,452 (incl. 32B of Msg)	~100

Controller: IFX 3 40nm (TC37x) with HSM activated

Benchmarking



Secure Boot

Library	QR Algorithm (Digital Signature)	Total Signature Time (ms)	Total Verification Time (ms)
pq-wolfSSL*	Dilithium	17.764	24.06

Secure Update

Library	QR Algorithm (KEM)	QR Algorithm (Digital Signature)	KEM Time (ms)	DEM Time (ms)	Sign. Gen. Time (ms)	Sign. Verification Time (ms)
pq-wolfSSL*	Kyber	Dilithium	3.58	3.41	242.02	99.77



Secure TLS

Library	QR Algorithm (KEM)	QR Algorithm (Digital Signature)	Server Time (ms)	Client Time (ms)
pq-wolfSSL	Kyber	Dilithium	48.14	7.66

Quantum-Resilient Security Controls

Benchmarking


SECURE TLS BENCHMARKING




Quantum-Resilient Security Controls

Benchmarking

SECURE UPDATE BENCHMARKING




Standalone refers to one signature scheme at all 3 stages i.e. root, icc, leaf which are NIST standardized.
Level 1, 2, 3, 5 refers to security levels of signature schemes.
Light Shade represents Signature Generation Time [ms]
Dark Shade represents Signature Verification Time [ms]




This graph refers the respective encryption and decryption times during the secure update process.

SECURE BOOT BENCHMARKING




Standalone refers to one signature scheme at all 3 stages i.e. root, icc, leaf which are NIST standardized.
Level 1, 2, 3, 5 refers to security levels of signature schemes.
Light Shade represents Total Signing Time [ms] = RootSig + ICCAlign + ServerSign
Dark Shade represents Total Verification Time [ms] = RootVer + ICCVer + ServerVer




Mixed here refers to first signature scheme at root stage and second signature scheme at icc and leaf stage, which are NIST standardized. Level 1, 3, 5 refers to security levels of signature schemes.

SECURE ACCESS BENCHMARKING



Standalone refers to one signature scheme at all 3 stages i.e. root, icc, leaf which are NIST standardized.
Level 1, 2, 3, 5 refers to security levels of signature schemes.
Total Certificate Verification Time = Root to ICC [ms] + ICC to Server [ms]



Mixed here refers to first signature scheme at root stage and second signature scheme at icc and leaf stage, which are NIST standardized. Level 1, 3, 5 refers to security levels of signature schemes.



Thank You

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